

AD-A168 398

BACKGROUND ISSUES CONCERNING  
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND SYRIAN  
INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by


John C. Burch  
Commander, U.S. Navy

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island

March 1986

The views contained herein are those of the author, and publication of this research by the Advanced Research Program, Naval War College does not constitute endorsement thereof by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other branch of the U.S. Government.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.



DTIC FILE COPY

A168398

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 85-37			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Advanced Research Program		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Naval War College Newport, RI 02841-5010			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Background Issues Concerning Soviet Foreign Policy and Syrian Initiatives in the Middle East				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Burch, John C. CDR, USN				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL		13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1986, March ,	
15. PAGE COUNT 94				
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Soviet Middle East policy, Syrian Foreign policy, Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, Lasting Middle East peace proposal	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The complexities of the contemporary Middle East have frustrated policymakers since the conclusion of World War II. Both superpowers seek regional influence, often at the expense of the other. This research identifies the Soviet's three fundamental foreign policy goals as (1) national security of the homeland on its southern flank, (2) exclusion of Western influence in the area, and (3) simultaneous growth of Soviet influence and presence. Syria has emerged as the principal Soviet client state within the region. Its foreign policy and relationship to the Soviets are at the focal point of most regional issues. The author examines the Russian-Syrian entente, and provides a proposal to resolve the regional dilemmas. <i>This proposal calls for a realignment of the West Bank of Jordan, the Golan Heights, and the Golan Valley.</i>				
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Head, Advanced Research Program			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 410-841-3359	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL 30A

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted.  
All other editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

☆U.S. Government Printing Office: 1985-839-012

0102-LF-014-6602

UNCLASSIFIED

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The complexities of the contemporary Middle East have frustrated policymakers, both East and West, since the conclusion of World War II. Both superpowers seek influence in the region and both have demonstrated their desires to minimize the other's potential and capacity to exercise the same. As such, the Middle East has emerged as the most likely theatre for direct superpower confrontation since the end of the Cold War. The list of regional problems is extensive. The Arab-Israeli conflict and resulting Palestinian dilemma and morass in Lebanon are at the forefront of key issues. Since the demise of the Soviet-Egyptian entente in the mid-1970's the Kremlin has turned to Syria to advance Soviet goals in the Middle East. While the Soviet-Syrian relationship does not produce the amount of leverage the Kremlin obviously desires, despite the impressive Russian financial investment in terms of military and economic aid, the Syrians do reinforce Moscow's diplomatic maneuverings whenever practical and consistent with Syrian goals.

This research paper addresses the problems of the Middle East from two perspectives. First, the author examines overall Soviet foreign policy objectives and then how Moscow attempts to reach those objectives through its regional actions. Second, he describes the Syrian viewpoint and its commensurate foreign policy goals. He discusses the germane Middle East rivalries as background issues which dramatize the degree of Soviet interest in

regional issues and contrasts them with Syrian actions.

The research is based upon over fifty books relating to the topic. The author has attempted to succinctly define the Middle East scenario and provide the reader with a broad perspective of regional issues. The last chapter provides a proposal for orchestrating a lasting and peaceful resolution to the intricate Middle East problem.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . .		ii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .		vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .		vii
I	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II	USSR FOREIGN POLICY . . . . .	3
	Historical Overview . . . . .	3
	Middle East . . . . .	7
	Stalin's Expansionism - Turkey, Iran . . . . .	8
	Stalin's Israeli Connection . . . . .	10
	USSR and Egypt - Mid 1950's Arms Supply . . . . .	10
	Brezhnev's Problems/1967 Arab-Israeli War . . . . .	11
	The Soviets - Sadat - 1973 Yom Kippur War . . . . .	12
	Late 1970's: The Israeli - Egyptian Agreement . . . . .	14
	Iran - Iraq War . . . . .	15
	The Soviets and the PLO . . . . .	16
	Current Perceptions of Israeli - Arab Settlement . . . . .	18
	Afghanistan . . . . .	20
	Soviet Middle East Summary . . . . .	21
III	SYRIA . . . . .	23
	Historical Perspective . . . . .	23
	Assad's Consolidation of Power . . . . .	25
	Internal Organization . . . . .	27
	Internal Opposition . . . . .	29
	The Succession Question . . . . .	31
	Foreign Policy - Israel/Golan Heights . . . . .	33
	Lebanon . . . . .	35
	Egypt . . . . .	38
	Iraq . . . . .	39
	Jordan . . . . .	40
	The PLO . . . . .	43
IV	USSR - SYRIA: THE LINK . . . . .	46
	Early Ties . . . . .	46
	Syrian Vulnerability . . . . .	48
	Friendship and Cooperation Treaty - 1980 . . . . .	51
	Military Involvement . . . . .	54
	The Future . . . . .	57

Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

V	CONCLUSION . . . . .	59
VI	AUTHOR'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROPOSAL . . . . .	60
TABLES	. . . . .	66
FIGURES	. . . . .	76
NOTES	. . . . .	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY	. . . . .	85

# LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
I.	Religious Composition of Syria's Population, 1985. . . . .	66
II.	Arab Population Figures . . . . .	67
III.	Israeli/Jewish Population Figures . . . . .	68
IV.	Rank Order of the Ten Largest Less Developed Arms Importing Countries . . . . .	69
V.	Rank Order of Middle Eastern States Dependent on USSR For Imports of Arms, 1963-1982 . . .	70
VI.	Soviet Military Assistance to Middle East Countries . . . . .	71
VII.	Value of Soviet Arms Transfers to Middle East Countries . . . . .	72
VIII.	Soviet Military Advisors in Middle East Countries . . . . .	73
IX.	Military Personnel From Middle East Countries Trained in USSR, 1955-1984 . . . . .	74
X.	Syrian Military Expenditures versus Gross National Product, 1973-1983 . . . . .	75

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
I	Israel and Occupied Territory after 1967 War . . . . .	76
II	Lebanon Today . . . . .	77
III	Author's Proposed Division of Israeli Occupied Territories . . . . .	78
IV	Author's Proposed Dismantling of Lebanon . .	79



## CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

The history of the Middle East has been characterized by tremendous suffering and conflict among its people. The biblical figure Abraham is the common patriarch who links the Jewish and Moslem religions in ancient history. In President Jimmy Carter's book, *The Blood of Abraham*, he dramatically recounts how the world's three great monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, all traced their heritage through Abraham's descendants. The Moslems consider themselves descendants of Abraham through his first son, Ishmael, born by his wife Sarah's Egyptian maid, Hagar. The Jews trace their heritage via Abraham's second son, Isaac, the first born son of Sarah. When Sarah later forced Hagar and Ishmael to leave Abraham's home the stage was set for unforeseen centuries of conflict between the descendants of the first two sons of Abraham. That struggle continues to have a major impact on the world today. The Middle East remains a highly volatile entity which has the potential to engulf the superpowers into the worldwide conflict neither desires.

For over a decade Syria has been the closest Soviet client state in the region. This research effort will address the reasons and impact of that association. Most Soviets justify their actions in the Middle East in terms of proximity to the Soviet homeland. It is easy for Americans to forget this fact. The Soviets share common borders with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. The southernmost Soviet city of Yerevan is only an hour flying

time from Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. Cairo is nearer to Moscow than either London or Paris. But physical proximity, which admittedly is strategically important, is only one aspect of Soviet concern in the Middle East. Moscow's worldwide strategy of increasing Soviet influence and prestige at the expense of Western leverage is also clearly evident in the Middle East. Under the leadership of Hafiz al-Assad, Syria has emerged as the most powerful remaining "confrontation" state in the Arab world to challenge the Israelis. Moscow has subsidized a majority of Assad's growth. However, the Islamic's aversion to atheistic communism has limited the scope of the Kremlin's control over Assad despite the Russian's substantial financial investment.

Chapter Two of the text conveys an overall historical picture of Soviet foreign policy since the Russian Revolution and specifically addresses the Middle East aspect of that policy. Chapter Three gives a historical perspective of Syria and its foreign policy. The Syrian-Russian relationship is specifically defined in Chapter Four which centers on the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed by the two countries in 1980. Conclusions and the author's own proposal for regional peace are postulated in the closing chapters. In all, the research effort is an attempt to define the intricate relationships of Russian and Syrian foreign policies and, more broadly, give the reader an added degree of insight into the complexities of Middle East problems.

## CHAPTER TWO - USSR FOREIGN POLICY

### HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Bolshevik's first priority after the Russian revolution was the withdrawal from the "imperialist's" First World War. Lenin's "peace, bread and land" philosophy implied a genuine non-interest in global expansion. Lenin preached that proletariat loyalty belonged to class not country, but simultaneously espoused the principles of national self-determination. Practical matters, dealing with consolidation of power at home, influenced early Soviet foreign policy toward isolationism before attempting to export the proletarian revolution worldwide. This dualism - advocating a worldwide revolution and assuring its own national security - has remained a prominent aspect of Soviet foreign policy.

Between the conclusion of World War II and 1982 there were only three prominent Russian leaders, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. To Stalin the single most important factor in foreign policy was the prevention of another land invasion of Mother Russia from the west. Consequently, Stalin attempted to insulate Russia by mandating pro-socialist governments in Eastern Europe. Stalin was labeled an expansionist, but his overriding concern was national security. In Stalin's eyes, security was synonymous with a permanent Soviet military presence, unquestioned political control, ideological conformity and economic subordination. Stalin's concept of hegemony and his absolutist perception of security precipitated what was commonly referred to as the Cold

War. Although Stalin concentrated on Europe he did further the Soviet position in the Far East also. His only major strategic error was allowing the North Koreans to attack the South, thus<sup>2</sup> bringing American military power back to the Far East.

Khrushchev assumed leadership in 1953 and immediately faced the problems of maintaining Stalin's "expansionist" empire despite growing nationalism in Eastern Europe. Major uprisings in East Germany, Hungary and Poland caused Khrushchev to reevaluate Stalin's policies. The resulting de-Stalinization period brought a relaxation of hard line programs both domestic and foreign. Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito of Yugoslavia and his subsequent embracing the "many roads to socialism" thesis was a major foreign policy change which reflected emerging international realities. Khrushchev was tolerant of diversity amongst the Warsaw Pact nations as long as Soviet strategic hegemony was not imperilled.<sup>3</sup>

Brezhnev's eighteen year reign (1964-1982) produced two major accomplishments, nuclear parity with the United States and the establishment of detente with the West. In 1977 Brezhnev succinctly defined Soviet foreign policy goals as follows:

1. Ensuring international conditions for building communism in the USSR.
2. Safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union.
3. Consolidating the positions of world socialism.
4. Supporting the struggle of peoples for national

liberation and social progress.

5. Preventing wars of aggression.

6. Achieving universal and complete disarmament.

7. Consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

Brezhnev's perception of the worldwide "correlation of forces" led Moscow to believe that detente would be the permanent basis for all future foreign policy initiatives. His participation in four summit meetings with American presidents in two and a half years symbolized unprecedented superpower dialogue. However, Brezhnev failed to foresee the emergent American hard-line reactions of President Reagan to Soviet moves in Poland and especially the Afghanistan invasion, consequently the early 1980's witnessed a rapid decline of detente. While SALT I and SALT II acknowledged the West's recognition of Soviet nuclear parity, American opposition to the Soviet natural gas pipeline and tightened economic export controls to Russia signaled the collapse of detente which clouded Brezhnev's last years in office. Eighteen years after taking office Brezhnev was once again on the defensive.<sup>4</sup>

Soviet foreign policy between World War II and 1982 can therefore be summarized as follows: the Stalin era characterized by expansionism in the name of national security; the Khrushchev era marked by attempts to consolidate the empire and a general relaxation of control, and the Brezhnev era when Soviet strategic

parity gave birth to detente, which then waned in face of new aggressive American policies to counter Soviet initiatives.

Brezhnev and his immediate successors, Andropov and Chernenko were the last Soviet leaders whose political educations were molded by Stalin and Khrushchev. The reigns of the latter two were too short in time to produce any major changes in Brezhnev's concept of Soviet foreign policy. Andropov and Chernenko, confronted with an atmosphere of deteriorating detente, pursued Brezhnev's two major objectives in foreign policy, gaining Western respect for the Soviets and establishing pro-socialistic stability within the Soviet sphere of influence. The emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, a full political and biological generation younger than his predecessor, portends the first real chance for change in Soviet foreign affairs since the Brezhnev era. Gorbachev was only a youngster in World War II and only a 22 year old neophyte in the Communist party when Stalin died in 1953. His 1985 summit meeting with President Reagan indicated that, while fundamental conceptional differences remain in East-West relations, the Kremlin was anxious to re-establish the detente era. Detente has singularly been the most effective Soviet foreign policy concept since Stalin's era and has produced the following advantages for the Soviet Union:

1. Acceptance by the United States of Soviet strategic parity.
2. The chance to limit the arms race, and thus reallocate

investment to the civilian economy.

3. An end to the East-West crisis in Europe and a shift of competition to the Third World.

4. Easing of tensions on the Soviet Union's western flank, and the chance to concentrate on China.

5. Recognition of Eastern Europe's postwar frontiers.

6. The opportunity to increase imports of goods,  
5  
technology, and capital from the West.

#### USSR FOREIGN POLICY - MIDDLE EAST

In the context of overall Soviet foreign policy, the Middle East has historically been considered subordinate to Europe and East Asia in priority. However, Brezhnev's detente policy provided relative stability in those areas which allowed the Middle East to emerge as a competitive battlefield for East-West confrontations. Soviet foreign policy objectives in the area can be broadly defined in three major categories: (1) national security of the homeland on its southern flank, (2) the exclusion of Western influence in the area, and (3) the simultaneous  
5  
growth of Soviet influence and presence in the area. The Soviet's are obviously aware of the dependence of Western Europe and Japan on Middle East oil reserves. Therefore, implicit in goals (2) and (3) is the concept of resource control or resource denial.

Ideologically, the Soviets have wrestled with the Middle East since the conclusion of World War II. To Moscow providing

aid to "bourgeois" nationalistic governments, even if they pursue "anti-imperialistic" foreign policies, strikes at the heart of communism. Arabs and Persians are also faced with equally difficult conceptual problems. There exists the underlying unreceptiveness of traditional Islam to the appeal of Marxism-Leninism. The Moslems accept the anti-imperialistic tenet of communism, but strongly reject principles supporting the supremacy of the working class, dialectical materialism, and especially atheism. For thousands of years the Moslems have coexisted with the Jews, albeit sometimes not very peacefully, but it has never been established that communism is compatible with either one. History has proven that foreign countries gain influence in the Middle East only after understanding, then accepting, the extremely critical role played by the underlying religions. Moscow has yet to master this technique.

#### STALIN'S EXPANSIONISM - TURKEY, IRAN

Turkey and Iran, which both are strategically located on the USSR's southern border, signed friendship treaties with the Soviet Union under the auspices of Lenin in 1921. Both countries exhibited Nazi sympathies during World War II, and it was not until after the 1945 Yalta Conference that the Turks finally declared war on Germany. Iran was jointly occupied by the British and Soviets in World War II in order to safeguard the supply flow to Russia. The allies had mutually agreed to withdraw within six months of war termination. However, Stalin attempted to gain a



7

foothold in both countries immediately after the war.

In Turkey the Soviets sought joint control of the Bosphorus and Dardenelles, strategically critical straits, through which passes one-half of Soviet sea-borne trade. The U.S. emphatically supported the 1936 Montreux Convention which recognized Turkish sovereignty over the straits and governed their use. The unsuccessful Soviet bid drove the Turks into the American camp (ultimately into NATO) and created a fervent anti-Soviet sentiment within Turkey.

8

In Iran Stalin balked at withdrawal from Azerbaijan, the Soviet occupied northern province. Finally the Russians departed after negotiating the formation of a joint-stock Soviet-Iranian oil company and autonomy, under a supposedly pro-socialist government, for Azerbaijan. However, shrewd Iranian diplomatic maneuvering nullified the economic treaty and returned Azerbaijan to Iran within one year of the Soviet exodus.

9

Stalin was extremely frustrated by the success of Turkey and Iran in countering Soviet initiatives. The Soviets immediately attempted to bolster their image by supporting a socialist revolution in Greece, which again proved unsuccessful and ultimately led to America's first two major post-war foreign policies - the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. containment policy. While Greece is admittedly outside the environment of the Middle East, the resulting American policies influenced Soviet-U.S. interactions in the Middle East for the years ahead.

### STALIN'S ISRAELI CONNECTION

Stalin was successful, and demonstrated significant far-sightedness, in quickly recognizing the government of Israel in 1948. In fact, weapons utilized by Israel in its war of independence came largely from Communist Czechoslovakia. However, this move was not centered on any latent desire for Jewish autonomy, but rather was symbolic of the overall Russian objective of diminishing Western influence in the Middle East, in this case the British.<sup>11</sup>

### USSR AND EGYPT - MID 1950's ARMS SUPPLY

Khrushchev discovered that military assistance was the key to leverage in the Middle East. The Soviets supported Nasser's nationalizing the Suez Canal Company after the U.S. withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan Dam. The Israeli, Anglo-French invasion of Egypt (the Suez War) quickly followed Nasser's unprecedented act. Khrushchev threatened "unilateral" action if Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai, but the Russians lacked the military wherewithal to implement this strategy. While it was the Americans who actually orchestrated the subsequent Israeli withdrawal, the Soviets claimed the credit, and more importantly commenced resupplying Egypt and Syria with military arms (funneled through Czechoslovakia to avoid upsetting the U.S.). Singularly, this event symbolized the Russians as the champions of the Arab cause. It was clearly evident that Nasser's prime concern was not communism, but fear of Israeli expansion. The

Russians were quick to capitalize on this fact. Both Egypt and Syria moved in a strong anti-Western direction as Moscow increased its arms supply to both nations.<sup>12</sup>

#### BREZHNEV'S PROBLEMS AND THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

In the decade between 1957-1967 the Soviets continued to arm the Arabs, but were unable to translate that aid into lasting and effective influence, a fundamental problem which continues to plague contemporary Soviet leadership. With Khrushchev's fall in 1964 Brezhnev faced three main problems in the Middle East: (1) insurance that Soviet aid would guarantee Soviet influence, (2) support of Arabs against Israel without direct confrontation with the U.S., and (3) reconciling Soviet assistance to bourgeois regimes while claiming a class-based foreign policy guided by the Marxist-Lennist doctrine.<sup>13</sup>

The Kremlin advised Egypt to be cautious, but Nasser evicted the U.N. peacekeeping forces from the Sinai, injected 100,000 Egyptian soldiers, and finally in May 1967 closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli traffic (refer to Figure 1 to grasp the strategic importance of the Straits of Tiran). Simultaneously, the renown military warrior, Moshe Dayan, was appointed Israel's Defense Minister and the stage was set for the next war.<sup>14</sup> While the 1967 War marked the Kremlin's first use of the Moscow - Washington hotline, installed four years earlier, the Soviets made it clear to Egypt that the Russians would not intervene militarily. Nasser later lamented the Russians were "frozen into

immobility by their fear of a confrontation with the Americans". Moscow did break off diplomatic relations with Israel which only thwarted future Soviet initiatives at being an effective player<sup>15</sup> in arbitrating the continuing Arab-Israel conflict.

The total Arab defeat in 1967 was a major setback to Russian prestige within the Middle East and initiated the biggest Soviet internal debate since Khrushchev's fall. The Arabs, China, and even Tito of Yugoslavia (Nasser's personal friend) strongly criticized Moscow for inaction in support of Egypt. Critics argued that the emerging detente policy had led to actual collusion with the Americans. The only immediate post-1967 War option available to the Soviets was their increase in military and<sup>16</sup> economic aid to the Arabs.

#### THE SOVIETS - SADAT - 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR - AFTERMATH

Sadat, the clever statesman who succeeded Nasser in 1970, orchestrated the 1971 Soviet - Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation. This marked the first time the USSR bound itself to<sup>17</sup> a military commitment in the Third World. Sadat quickly attempted to extract additional arms from the Soviets to sustain his "war of attrition" against Israel. Brezhnev, publicly proclaiming detente and courting Nixon at the 1972 summit, refused additional Egyptian aid. An infuriated Sadat boldly expelled all Soviet military advisors (15,000) from Egypt. Three months later Sadat asked the Soviets to resume their arms supply which they, unbelievably, did without question. Sadat's easy

manipulation of Moscow was indicative of Soviet frustrations in the area. Sadat soon gained the wherewithal for his long-planned crossing of the Suez Canal.<sup>18</sup>

Sadat surprised the world, even the Soviets, with the coordinated Arab invasion and ensuing Yom Kippur War in 1973. Unlike 1967, the Soviets were quick to resupply Egypt and Syria with munitions. Initial Arab victories encouraged the Soviets not to intervene militarily. However, as the tide turned with increased U.S. aid to Israel, the Russians urged an immediate ceasefire. Ultimately, with the Israelis surrounding the Egyptian Third Army on the banks of the Suez Canal, the Russians threatened unilateral military action. Brezhnev pressed Nixon to send U.S. troops along with Russian troops to ensure a ceasefire. In Henry Kissinger's words, "We were determined to resist by force if necessary the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East".<sup>19</sup> An increased readiness state was sounded in the U.S. military, an unprecedented action in the nuclear age. On the verge of a superpower confrontation the U.N. security council passed a ceasefire resolution calling for the warring parties to disengage under the guidance of the U.S. and Soviets. This was a major political gain for Moscow, giving the Soviets a supposedly co-equal role with the U.S. in arbitrating Middle East peace.<sup>20</sup>

After the 1973 war Sadat, in yet another reversal, turned to Washington for future assistance which openly alienated the Soviets. The next few years were fraught with increasing

Egyptian-Soviet tension. Finally in 1976 Sadat unilaterally abrogated the 1971 treaty with Russia. Soviet influence in the Middle East, which peaked when Nasser was on the warpath in the mid-1950's, had reached a new low twenty years later. Moscow was forced to look elsewhere for leverage and consequently found the more radical Syria a willing ally. By the mid-1970's Syria<sup>21</sup> replaced Egypt as the chief client state in the Middle-East.

#### LATE 1970'S: THE ISRAELI - EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT

The Kremlin viewed any Arab-Israeli agreement concluded without its participation as anti-Soviet. Four key events in the late 1970's crystallized Russian concern on this issue: (1) the mutual abrogation within months of the joint 1977 Soviet-American statement concerning future Middle East stability, (2) Sadat's widely heralded trip to Jerusalem in 1977, (3) the 1978 Carter sponsored Camp David accords, and (4) the formal Egyptian-Israeli<sup>22</sup> peace treaty in 1979. These events hardened Moscow's resolve to polarize the remainder of the Arab world, under Soviet tutelage, against the Egyptians. The Arab states, minus Egypt, convened two Bagdad Conferences in succeeding years to protest the Egyptian-Israeli agreements. However, despite increased pressure from the Soviets, a cohesive anti-Sadat Arab front never materialized. When Egypt exercises Arabwide leadership its population, military strength, and cultural influence enable it to do so. When it chooses not to lead, but seeks unilateral resolutions, no other Arab state has the capacity to correlate a united Arab front.

From Moscow's viewpoint the only positive development from the Baghdad meetings was Syria's reconciliation with Iraq, both pro-Soviet states whose long-standing differences often complicated Soviet diplomacy, and even this rapprochement did not last<sup>23</sup> long.

#### IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Although surprised, the Soviets were pleased to observe the Shah's downfall in Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. The closing of Western intelligence gathering stations along the Soviet border, Iran's withdrawal from CENTO (which collapsed shortly thereafter), Iran's initial recognition of the Communist party in Iran (Tudeh), and Khomeini's fervent hatred of America all favored the Soviets. Interactions with Khomeini's Iran, however, proved tougher than the Kremlin expected. The ensuing Iran-Iraq war only complicated the issue. Iraq steadfastly upheld the radical pan-Arabism theme, while Iran struggled to export its fundamental Islamic revolution to both Arab and non-Arab states. (Note: a common mistake by most Americans is that the Iranians are Arabs, quite the contrary, they are Persians, entirely different than Arabs, albeit both follow branches of the Islamic faith). Superimposed on the ideological confrontation was this historic Gulf rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians. Moscow was linked to Iraq by treaty and Iraq was a Soviet leader in sponsoring Arab dissatisfaction with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Brezhnev initially suspended arms shipments to Iraq to maintain some semblance of neutrality, but in 1983,

Andropov renewed the supply in reaction to Khomeini's growing anti-Soviet sentiments. Iran was openly critical of the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan and further alienated the Russians by persecuting, then formally abolishing the communist Tudeh Party in Iran. Khomeini repeated his "neither East nor West" policy and called the Russians as great a "satan" as the Americans. While the Soviets continued to call for a ceasefire on the diplomatic front, Russian military aid to Iraq continued. Complicating the Soviet policy was the fact that Syria, Moscow's most important client in the Middle East, had another shift in relations with Iraq and now supported Iran.<sup>24</sup>

#### THE SOVIETS AND THE PLO

The Kremlin's relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been essentially pragmatic and unencumbered by any moral convictions on the overriding Palestinian problem. When the PLO was officially formed in 1964 to serve as an umbrella organization for the roughly three million Palestinians scattered throughout the Middle East, the Soviets saw little profit in supporting an acknowledged terrorist group bent on the destruction of Israel. The Soviets have consistently stated that any Middle East settlement must guarantee Israel's existence. However, after Sadat turned pro-Western the Soviets began to appreciate the utility of the PLO as a tool to further Russian leverage.<sup>25</sup> The Kremlin commenced open support of the PLO which culminated in official diplomatic status in 1979.<sup>26</sup>



The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent forced evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut left the Palestinian movement in a precarious position throughout the Middle East. After over twenty years as the accepted flag bearer of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO was no closer to the establishment of a Palestinian state than in 1964. Internal and external constraints have limited the utility of the PLO and, concomitantly have stifled the Kremlin's attempts to maximize Soviet leverage. Internally, the PLO's eight heterogeneous groups, each with its own ideological concepts, have made central management almost impossible. Yasir Arafat, leader of the largest group - Fatah, has attempted to maintain control of the PLO and preserve a unified structure. However, Saiga and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), wholly controlled subsidiaries of Syria and Iraq, coupled with the more radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), are all committed to more militant tactics than Fatah. Arafat's current perceptions of a negotiated settlement with Israel, thus implicitly recognizing Israel's existence, as the means to Palestinian autonomy have not received unified organizational support. Externally, the perilous world of inter-Arab rivalries has dominated the PLO's efforts. Syria has emerged as the PLO's staunchest defender and yet paradoxically as potentially its most powerful adversary. Consequently, the ability of the Soviets to utilize the PLO in furthering Russian

influence has proven as difficult as the organization's own<sup>27</sup>  
ability to create a Palestinian state.

#### CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI-ARAB SETTLEMENT

In 1982 there were three major initiatives announced to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict and establish permanent Middle East peace: the Reagan Plan, the Arab Plan, and the Brezhnev Plan. On September 1, 1982 President Reagan articulated the following proposals: (1) a stop to Israeli settlement activity on the West Bank; (2) refusal of U.S. to accept any Israeli claim to sovereignty over the West Bank; (3) assurance of Israeli border security and that the border should not be pre-1967 war boundaries; (4) the unity of Jerusalem; (5) direct Arab-Israeli negotiations; (6) opposition to a Palestinian state on the West Bank; and the most controversial, (7) a fully autonomous Palestinian entity linked to Jordan. Both the Soviets and<sup>28</sup> Israelis were quick to strongly criticize this proposal.

On September 9, 1982 the Arab summit concluded at Fez, Morocco and the Arab Plan was announced. This called for (1) Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem; (2) the dismantling of settlements established by Israel in the occupied territories; (3) guarantees for worship; (4) affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the PLO as their sole legitimate representative; (5) a transition period for the West Bank and Gaza; (6) the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with

Jerusalem as its capital; (7) the guarantee of peace and security of all states by the U.N. Security Council, and (8) the guarantee of the implementation of these principles by the U.N. Security Council. The Fez proposal did not explicitly reject the Reagan Plan and met with moderate toleration from the Soviets, albeit the Israelis were quick to reject the proposal.<sup>29</sup>

Two major aspects of the Reagan Plan worried the Soviets (1) Washington's determination to exclude Moscow from the peace process, and (2) the attempts to draw Jordan into negotiations leading to a federation between Jordan and a West Bank entity administered by Palestinians not members of the PLO. The Arab Plan implicitly recognized Israel and also provided a Soviet role through the reference to the Security Council, both concepts consistent with Soviet policy.<sup>30</sup>

On September 15, 1982 Brezhnev delineated his plan consisting of six points: (1) Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories; (2) establishment of an independent Palestinian state; (3) return of East Jerusalem to the Arabs; (4) security assurances for all states in the region, including Israel; (5) an end to the state of war between Israel and the Arab countries, and (6) guarantees of the settlement by the U.N. Security Council. This plan has remained the Soviet's declaratory policy through the Andropov, Chernenko, and currently Gorbachev regimes. It differs little from the Arab Plan, but due to point six remains unacceptable to the Americans for the same reason the Reagan Plan is unacceptable to the Russians.<sup>31</sup>

## AFGHANISTAN

The Soviets viewed their invasion of Afghanistan as an act of national security, though the West saw it as an act of expansion. The Kremlin's purpose for the first post-World War II deployment of a large combat contingent outside the Warsaw Pact area was to maintain Afghanistan's twenty-five year history of official nonalignment, but close cooperation with the Soviet Union. A 1978 Afghan coup, unsponsored by the Russians, brought a pro-Soviet regime to power. This regime attempted a rapid social transformation which alienated the masses and ultimately led to a strong counter-revolutionary movement. Despite continued frustration with the Communist leadership in Afghanistan, the Soviets were afraid any new government would, at the very least, be anti-Soviet. Therefore, when the Afghan government requested Soviet assistance in suppressing the rebels, the Kremlin responded with military force. Brezhnev cited the Soviet's 1979 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Afghanistan as international justification for the invasion. Additionally, Moscow perceived that failure to rescue the pro-Soviet Afghan regime<sup>32</sup> would have been a severe blow to Russian pride and prestige.

The ensuing Soviet frustration in militarily fighting the Afghan guerrilla movement has many parallels with the American experience in Vietnam. Soviet strategy has become one of attempting to achieve a military stalemate in the hope of an eventual political stabilization. The invasion has cost the Russians

significantly on the international diplomatic front. Syria was the only Arab state not to criticize the Soviet invasion and the United States must relish the economic impact the Russians have expended in sustaining one hundred thousand troops in a corner of Southwest Asia. In short, the Kremlin's position in the Middle East has suffered due to the Afghan invasion. It is likely that Gorbachev will continue efforts to extricate the Soviets from Afghanistan, but Soviet withdrawal will be contingent upon a basic nonalignment policy of the surviving Afghan government. 33

#### SOVIET - MIDDLE EAST SUMMARY

Soviet Middle East goals have remained consistent since the Stalin era: (1) ensure its national security along the southern borders; (2) minimize Western influence; (3) promote Soviet influence. While the first goal is clearly tangible, and realistically beyond the scope of Western foreign policies to drastically alter, goals two and three remain very much in doubt. The turbulent structure of Middle East society has frustrated Soviet attempts at sustaining more than transitory leverage. Moscow's initiatives to solidify its influence through the conclusion of long-term Friendship and Cooperation Treaties (Egypt-1971, Iraq-1972, Somalia-1974, Ethiopia-1978, Afghanistan-1978, Democratic Yemen-1979, Syria-1980) have been only partly successful considering later repudiations by Egypt in 1976 and Somalia in 1977. The Arab-Israeli conflicts provided the Kremlin with a convenient issue for exploiting regional vulnerabilities, but the decline of

detente has paralleled American maneuvers to isolate Russia from the peace table. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the instabilities of Lebanon and the PLO have all worked against the Soviets. The principal client state is now unquestionably Syria. The Kremlin has certainly recognized the intrinsic strategic and economic significance of the Middle East. It's highly unlikely that Mikhail Gorbachev will reduce Soviet efforts to enhance the Russian sphere of influence.

## CHAPTER THREE - SYRIA

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Modern Syria was born in the wake of World War I to serve the interest of France and Great Britain. The conclusion of World War II terminated the French Mandate. The French departed on May 17, 1946, a day still celebrated with fervor throughout the country.<sup>1</sup> During the first two decades following independence Syria earned the reputation as the most coup-prone state in the Middle East. Twenty-three changes of government, fifteen by military coup, occurred between 1946 and 1970.<sup>2</sup> The United Arab Republic (UAR), a flirtation at unity with Egypt between 1958 and 1961, was unable to stabilize underlying Syrian factionalism. An equally unsuccessful alliance in 1963 with Egypt and Iraq thwarted the pan-Arabism movement. The historical factors which contributed to such strong sectarianism in Syria are pertinent to understanding this complex society.<sup>3</sup>

The formation of different sects within Islam and Christianity is reflected in Table 1. During the Ottoman Empire (1517-1918) central authority was controlled by the majority Sunni Moslems from the urban areas. The heterodox Moslems were persecuted and forced into the countryside. This persecution of the minority sects provided strong communal cohesiveness within the major heterodox groups. All Moslems and Christians were opposed to the French Mandate following World War I, albeit for different reasons. The Sunnis professed the pan-Arab doctrine hoping to

unite the entire Arab world into one nation. The non-Sunnis were necessarily more localistic in concept and preferred a Syria independent of its neighbors. The significance of this dual development of political consciousness cannot be overemphasized. <sup>4</sup>

The emergence of the minority Alawi military officers to the most dominant positions in the government dates back to the Baathist coup in 1963. Orchestrated by three Alawi officers (Hafiz al-Assad being one) over half the 700 officers purged in the aftermath were replaced by Alawis. <sup>5</sup> The Syrian army has continued a tradition of ethnic minority overrepresentation since its inception for four major reasons. First, the French selectively recruited military personnel from the minorities to prevent Syrian unity. Second, the urbanized Sunni Moslems could afford the military exemption fee (which still exists today) while the rural minorities could not. Third, the Alawis viewed a military career in the context of educational and social advancement. Fourth, the Alawis, once in power, tended to recruit and promote their own. <sup>6</sup> Contemporary Syria remains controlled by the minority Alawi sect whose population represents less than fourteen percent of the population. <sup>7</sup>

The term "Baath" means "resurrection" or "renaissance". It was the name given to the progressive nationalist party founded in Damascus in 1943. The Baath Party was originally conceived to be the leading proponent of a single Arab socialist nation. The early 1960 vintage Baath party was divided into two factions, the pan-Arabists and the regionalists. The energies of the latter



focused on Syria and its immediate environs. In February, 1966, the regionalists seized power in another violent coup that split the pan-Arab Baath party in two, one centered in Syria and one in Iraq, a division which still exists and has had strong implications on Syrian foreign policy. Unchallenged military dominance, under the aegis of the Baathists, dates from this seizure of power. Salah Jadid, the Alawi officer who ruled Syria from 1966-1970, advocated a state-run economy and strongly supported the PLO's national liberation struggle. In early 1970 Jadid sent military forces into Jordan to assist the PLO in their struggle with King Hussein, who was destined to evict the PLO from Jordan. At the time Hafiz al-Assad represented a more pragmatic and less ideological approach within the government to Syrian diplomacy. As head of the Air Force, Assad refused to supply air cover for Jadid's ill-fated Jordanian invasion force. Assad's success in confronting Jadid led to a bloodless coup later in the year. For the last fifteen years Syria has, uncharacteristically, been led by one man, Hafiz al-Assad.

#### ASSAD'S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

Assad, also a member of the minority Alawi sect, was initially criticized by orthodox Moslems who challenged his attempts to separate Islamic heritage from politics and adopt a secular approach to government. Some viewed the neo-Baath regime as a purely military rule established by physical force against the wishes of the majority, but despite his critics Assad established

unprecedented stability. Conscious of Alawi resentment, Assad emphasized the supra-communal character of his government. He fired Alawi officers responsible for the 1973 war failure and appointed Sunni, Druze, and Christians to demanding, yet "safe" positions. He minimized the differences between the various Moslem sects and stressed the commonalities of all Islamic faiths.<sup>9</sup>

Politically, Assad shrewdly manipulated the Baath party apparatus. Henry Kissinger once described Assad as one of the most intelligent personalities he had ever met. In 1972 Assad astutely expanded his power base by forming a national unity government, officially titled the National Progressive Front. Although headed by Baathist, the government included the Syrian Communist Party, the Socialist Arab Unions, and the Arab Socialists. Thus, the political savvy of Assad enhanced the acceptance of his regime within the Syrian political infrastructure.<sup>10</sup>

Economically, Assad specifically targeted the influential urban Sunnis who opposed the government not only on religious ground, but also because of the socialist preferences of the Baath party. By improving the general living standard, raising income levels, and providing social security, Assad adeptly cultivated the approval of the masses. Other economic initiatives included: (1) easement of socialistic economic policies; (2) encouragement of private investments; (3) removal of import restrictions; (4) lower unemployment; (5) lower taxes, and (6) the

expansion of both agriculture and industry. The economic liberalization produced a 159 percent growth in the GNP between 1970 and 1975. In short, the average Syrian's economic position rapidly improved under Assad's leadership.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, Assad introduced compulsory education. University tuitions were completely subsidized which triggered an explosion in higher education. Consequently these institutions quickly became very overcrowded. Syria was also the first Arab nation to extend the vote to women.<sup>12</sup>

However, unquestionably the fundamental factor in Assad's survival has been the sectarian loyalty of the Alawi officers. In a country where military coups were common, Assad went overboard in placating his officer corps. Additionally, Assad appointed his five brothers, and many of his close family to key positions in the military and governmental security organizations. This tactic has proven successful in shielding Assad from military coups.<sup>13</sup>

#### INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

Before examining the external political impact of Syrian foreign policy it is necessary to appreciate the internal organization. A triad consisting of the Baath party, the governmental structure and the military establishment forms the basic components of the Syrian state. The Baath party, originally founded on pan-Arabism principles, continues a symbolic pledge to pan-Arabism through the twenty-one man National Command. Headed by

Assad, the group consists of half Syrians and half Arabs from other states, but has little practical influence in the government. The twenty-one man Regional Command, also headed by Assad, actually directs Baath politics. Below the Regional Command are a layer of branch commands, one for each of the thirteen provinces, one each in Damascus and Aleppo, and one each in the three major universities. Attached to the party are a panoply of people's organizations (Revolutionary Youth Organization, Union of Student Women's Organization, Peasants' Federation, etc.). In all, the party is a large bureaucracy which extends to all socioeconomic levels of the country. Syria's ideological practices are solidly based in Baath party concepts.<sup>14</sup>

The governmental structure is highly centralized, concentrating power in the president. The president determines government policy, appoints and dismisses prime ministers and cabinets, promulgates laws, heads the armed forces and has veto power of the Peoples' Assembly. The Regional Command nominates a person to run for president. The cabinet is an executive rather than a policymaking body. The People's Assembly is chosen by universal suffrage, half of the members must be workers and peasants. Serving primarily as a discussion forum, this group has no independent power. The thirteen provinces and the separately administered cities of Damascus and Aleppo into which Syria is divided are subordinate to the central government in Damascus.<sup>15</sup> Provincial governors are appointed by the president.

The third element of the triad is the military establishment. It would be hard to overstate the influence of the military in Syria. Conscription provides a standing force of over two hundred thousand men. The fee to buy immunity from service has been raised in recent years to several thousand dollars, therefore, most males serve and are thoroughly indoctrinated in Baath ideology and patriotic sentiments. The officer corps is the key military element in Syria. Cadets at the military academy are schooled in Baath party tenets prior to joining the officers corps. It is the officer corps which provides the fundamental power base within Syria.<sup>16</sup>

#### INTERNAL OPPOSITION

Despite the unprecedented stability of Assad's regime throughout the 1970's the sectarian forces have produced a credible challenge to his rule in the 1980's. Assad's rise to power has been high, but his power base has remained very narrow. The most serious opposition has been from branches of the Moslem Brotherhood, a loosely organized Islamic movement espousing the restoration of Islamic fundamentalism. This organization, which includes the more radical of Sunni Moslems, but is not limited to that sect, has been in existence in the Middle East for many decades. Between 1978 and 1980 scores of Alawi officers and Baathist officials were assassinated by the Moslem Brotherhood. This culminated in a 1980 armed rebellion in Aleppo which was brutally suppressed by the Alawis. In 1982 an even larger

rebellion engulfed the country and left an estimated 6,000 civilians dead. This clash involved not only the Brotherhood, but also large numbers of the entire Sunni population.<sup>17</sup> Assad was successful in quelling the insurgence, however the events were the catalyst for the establishment of an opposition front, the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria. Its members include the Moslem Brotherhood, the Islamic Front and the pro-Iraqi Baathists. The charter of this organization is the downfall of Assad's regime and the establishment of a constitutional<sup>18</sup> parliamentary government.

The post-1982 period has been characterized by a tense calm in Syria. Radical Sunni animosity toward the government has remained unabated. Assad continued to evoke mixed reactions from the populace. The harshness of his regime and the brutality with which he suppressed dissidents aroused resentment and fear. In January 1985 Assad attempted to diffuse the opposition by granting general amnesty for certain Brotherhood factions. Additionally, the Islamic opposition has found it difficult to forge a united front. The majority of the Sunni Arab population remained reluctant to risk their socioeconomic gains of the past decade by challenging Assad's rule. While the cohesiveness of the government was not as tight as ten years ago, Assad's immediate prospects for retaining power remained favorable.<sup>19</sup>

## THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

In November, 1983, Hafiz al-Assad was hospitalized after suffering a heart attack. Attempts by the government to mask Assad's illness as appendicitis quickly failed. Although presently sufficiently recovered to serve as president, Assad's heart problem (he is also a diabetic) continued to stir the succession question. During his prolonged recovery various factions within the government maneuvered to enhance their positions which almost triggered open warfare. The controversy centered on Rifaat al-Assad, the president's unpopular brother. Rifaat, a product of Alawi nepotism, was renowned for his extravagance and unapologetic hedonism. As commander of the elite 50,000 man Saraya al-Difaa or Defense Companies, Syria's highest paid and best equipped military unit, Rifaat was often criticized for his high-handed tactics which allegedly included kidnapping, beating, and extortion. In February, 1984, while Hafiz al-Assad was in the midst of recovery, Rifaat's forces challenged elements of the regular army in a muscle-flexing standoff on the outskirts of Damascus. While civil war did not erupt, it was precariously close. Hafiz, in an attempt to defuse the tensions within his regime, named Rifaat along with two others, Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Zuhayr Masharighah, as vice presidents in March, 1984. Some viewed this move as an effort to confer some political respectability to Rifaat, others thought Hafiz was trying to separate Rifaat from his power base as head of the Defense Companies. In May, 1984, Rifaat commenced a six month "exile" from Syria.

While Rifaat lived in France, the motives behind his absence were widely speculated upon in Syria. Mustafa Tlas, the Defense Minister, led the critics of Rifaat and publically called him a "permanent persona non grata". With Rifaat away, Hafiz, ostensibly in good health again, reconsolidated his power base. The Defense Companies were reorganized and reduced in size from 50,000 to 10,000 men. Parallel changes occurred in other previous bastions of Rifaat's power base. Quietly, Rifaat returned to Syria in late November, 1984, and resumed his role as vice-president, albeit in a considerably subdued manner.

While Hafiz's health appears satisfactory now, an untimely death to a heart attack could trigger a complicated and bloody struggle for succession within Syria. There is currently no leading candidate amongst the Alawi officer corps. While Rifaat remains a major consideration, his many opponents would most likely strive for some type of coalition. Hafiz's 27-year old son is another possibility. Other potential leaders include Mustafa Tlas, the Sunni Defense Minister and Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the civilian vice-president who specializes in foreign affairs. Meanwhile, the People's Assembly approved the Baath Party Regional Command's decision to nominate Hafiz Al-Assad for another seven year term in January, 1985. On March 13, 1985, Hafiz commenced serving that term. Nevertheless, the succession question might resurface at any time should Assad's health falter.



## FOREIGN POLICY - ISRAEL/GOLAN HEIGHTS

Syria unsuccessfully challenged the establishment of the Israeli nation in 1948. From 1949 until 1967, Syria reflected the conventional Arab policy towards Israel of non-recognition, verbal hostility, and increasing border incidents. The emergence of the Baath regionalists to power in the mid-1960's significantly increased Syria's anti-Israeli posture. The new government strongly supported the Palestinian national liberation movement. This ultimately led to Israel's crushing defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967. Israel captured the Golan Heights region during this war (refer to Figure 1). Following this debacle Syria departed from the Arab mainstream and adopted a more radical approach to the Israeli problem. While Egypt accepted the landmark United Nations Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war and tacitly acknowledged the existence of Israel, Syria staunchly refused to recognize the Jewish state and increased its support of the PLO.

In 1970 Assad brought a more pragmatic, and far less ideological, view to Syrian foreign policy. He supported the Palestinian cause, but was not as quick to seek armed conflict. Consequently, the PLO forces, who had been pushed from Jordan into Syria, started migrating into Lebanon. Assad also sought improved relations with Egypt. Together with Sadat and Qaddafi, Assad agreed to a tripartite pact linking Syria, Egypt and Libya in a future Federation of Arab Republics (FAR). In a major

policy revision, Assad conditionally accepted U.N. Resolution  
23  
242.

In 1973 Sadat coordinated the joint Egyptian-Syrian invasion of Israel known as the Yom Kippur War. Initial Syrian battles along the Golan Heights were successful, but the Israelis recovered and pushed the Syrians further back from the strategically critical Golan Heights area. The Syrians ended up losing 600,000 square kilometers of territory in addition to the area lost in 1967. At the end of hostilities, a separation of forces agreement was orchestrated by Henry Kissinger. The following year Kissinger was unsuccessful in achieving a second stage disengagement agreement along the Golan Heights. However, Kissinger did achieve a second stage disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai ("Sinai II"). This agreement signaled a major change in Syrian foreign policy toward Egypt. The Syrians felt betrayed and were critical of Egypt's acceptance of "Sinai II". Assad concluded that Egypt was no longer a creditable strategic threat to Israel. The return of the Golan Heights has remained the focal point of Syrian-Israeli relations. In quest of "secure borders", Israel has aggressively postured to enhance its grip on the Golan by the establishment of over three dozen settlements (over 4000 inhabitants) in the region. In 1981 the Begin administration extended Israeli law to govern the Golan. Even the Druze inhabitants of the area were pressed to obtain Israeli citizenship. However, the Syrians view

permanent cession of any part of the Golan as unacceptable and the termination of Israeli control and return of Syrian sovereignty as a sine qua non of any settlement.

24

#### LEBANON

The complexity of the Lebanese scenario almost defies definition. Syria always viewed Lebanon as a surrogate state and has not hesitated to intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs when Syria felt such intervention was in its best interest. Since Lebanon was only made into a separate state during the period of the French Mandate, Syria has never formally recognized it as a foreign country. Syria has never exchanged embassies with Beirut for this reason. The Lebanese governmental structure does not lend itself to prevent such diplomacy. By law the Lebanese president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister, a Sunni Moslem, and the speaker of the parliament a Shiite Moslem. This system was established in 1943 to reflect religious population percentages. (Note: there has not been a census in Lebanon since 1932 and modern experts theorize that the Shiites may now be in the majority).

25

As the Palestinian guerrillas infiltrated Lebanon in the early 1970's an alliance formed between the PLO and leftist Moslem activist known as the National Movement. The Maronites and conventional Moslems, faced with open rebellion from the PLO and National Movement groups, threatened partition and the creation of a separate Maronite state. Fearing that such a state

would be favorable to Israel, Assad sent the Syrian army into Lebanon in 1976 to restore order. The Syrians initially sided with the Maronites, but after re-establishing order switched sides and commenced support of the PLO. The memory of Syrian soldiers in alliance with Maronite Christians killing Moslem Arabs and Palestinians has not been forgotten within the Palestinian movement.<sup>26</sup> The civil war reflected the intriguing mosaic of Lebanese society and transformed Lebanon into a protectorate of Syria. The Saudi sponsored Riyadh conference in 1976 terminated the conflict and legitimized the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon together with preserving the PLO as a viable entity. The Riyadh conference effectively recognized Syrian hegemony over the entire country.<sup>27</sup>

While Syria avoided direct confrontation with Israel when the latter invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 to eradicate the PLO, the same was not true four years later. The Israeli Lebanon invasion in 1982 struck both the Palestinians and Syrians a devastating blow. The Syrians absorbed heavy losses on the ground and in the air. Additionally, the Russian supplied anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley were all destroyed.<sup>28</sup> With the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon the Syrians reinforced their military positions along the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway and in the Bekaa Valley (refer to Figure 2 for map of Lebanon). However, the internal fighting between the various religious sects continued within Lebanon. It was in Syria's best interest to stabilize the Lebanese situation,

however, Assad proved as ineffective as the Americans at accomplishing this goal. The Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, and PLO all espoused parochial concepts of Lebanon's destiny which frustrated Assad's diplomatic overtures.

In late 1985 Assad initiated another major effort to impose peace in Lebanon. In an imaginative maneuver Assad coerced the three most powerful Lebanese warlords, Nabih Berri of the Amal Shiites, Walid Jumblatt of the Druze, and Elie Hobeika the commander of the Christian militia, to sign an agreement to disband their forces over the next year in return for future equal governmental representation for both Moslems and Christians. This was the first attempt at a ceasefire agreement involving the actual warring factions vice their pseudo political leadership. Lebanon's Maronite Christian president, Amin Gemayal, disagreed with the concessions made by Hobeika to the Moslem factions which resulted in open warfare within the Christian ranks. The lack of Christian unity concerning the proposed agreement will significantly impact its implementation. However, Assad perceived that peace would come to Lebanon only if a fundamental restructuring of political, social, and economic power occurred which would reduce Maronite domination and enhance the relative positions of the Druze and the Shiites, the largest single group in Lebanon.

29

In early 1986 Syria moved three clusters of short-range Soviet-built SAM-6 and SAM-8 antiaircraft missiles into the Bekaa

Valley in Lebanon. Previously Syria had installed medium range SAM-2 missiles on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Lebanese border. All these missiles are a tactical threat to routine Israeli reconnaissance missions flown in the region. Consequently, Assad has heightened the tension and seized escalation control authority (assuming the Israelis do not preemptively strike at the aforementioned sites). If Assad does not perceive that the Jordanian initiatives on resolving the Palestinian problem are consistent with Syrian interests he could almost certainly stop such negotiations by creating a crisis in the Bekaa Valley. Assad's obvious goal in Lebanon is to remain the dominant player, so strong that nothing can be settled without his consent.

#### EGYPT

Egypt is unquestionably the most powerful Arab country in the Middle East. Table 2 reflects the Egyptian population dominance in the region. Therefore, all other Arab states must base their inter-Arab relationships on the Egyptian factor, be it as friend or foe. Syria's two attempts at unification with Egypt, UAR between 1958-1961 and the proposed FAR in the early 1970's, were unsuccessful. The current Syrian-Egyptian rift, which commenced with Egypt's acceptance of the "Sinai II" disengagement of forces agreement, was further exacerbated by Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, the Camp David accords, and ultimately Egypt's unilateral treaty with Israel. Therefore, for the past decade Syria has sought to mold a cohesive coalition of Arab states (minus Egypt) to confront the Israelis. Assad has refused to accept the

basic tenets of the Camp David accords as the basis for regional peace. In 1979 Syria joined Algeria, PDPY, Libya, and the PLO in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to challenge the emerging rapprochement between Egypt and Israel. This coalition<sup>31</sup> fundamentally rejected any dealings whatsoever with Israel.

There are indications that Egypt does desire to return to the mainstream of Arab political consciousness. The moderate Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, have been sympathetic to Egypt's return, but are hesitant to accept a country which has made a separate peace with Israel. Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor in Egypt, withdrew the Egyptian ambassador from Israel after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Mubarak added that there would be no exchange of ambassadors until Israel withdrew from Lebanon, which they have now done, and Israel stopped all<sup>32</sup> settlements on the West Bank, which they have not done.

#### IRAQ

Syrian and Iraqi Baathists each considered themselves as the legitimate successors to the original party. Assad's implacable resolve to continue feuding with fellow Baathists in Iraq has been a stumbling block in both country's foreign policies. Since 1968, when the Iraqi Baathists rose to power in Baghdad, Syrian-Iraqi relations have been fraught with controversy. However, the Egyptian-Israeli agreements in the late 1970's initially stimulated a rapprochement between Syria and Iraq. The two governments signed an agreement and pledged closer cooperation.

Previous arguments concerning the flow of Iraqi oil across Syrian territory, Iraqi claims that Syrian Euphrates dam initiatives were depriving Iraqi farmers of vitally needed water, and Syrian charges of Iraqi assassination attempts in Syria were reconciled in an attempt to establish a united front. The momentum for continued rapprochement received a sharp blow a few months later when Saddam Husayn, the new Iraqi president, accused the Syrians of plotting an assassination attempt. Syrian-Iraqi relations quickly reverted to the hostile stages characteristic of their association since the Baathists took power in 1968. Additionally, the ideological dispute within the two Baathists groups resurfaced with renewed fervor. In this anti-Iraq climate Syria chose to support Iran in that country's continuing war with Iraq. In 1982 Syria closed its borders to Iraq and shut down the Iraqi oil export pipeline. Assad's continued support of Persian Iran has continued to infuriate the other regional Arab states who all support Iraq. This circumstance has further alienated Syria from mainstream Arab cohesiveness. Some day the Iran-Iraq war will end and then Iraq's manpower resources (greater than Syria's), its large oil reserves, and bloodied, but combat experienced army, could make Assad sorry for siding with Iran and damaging Iraq's economy by closing its oil pipelines through Syria.

#### JORDAN

Jordan and Syria always had long-standing territorial disputes. Additionally, different concepts of the Palestinian



problem exacerbated the rivalry. Tension between the Jordanian Palestinians and the parent government resulted in a civil war in 1970 ("Black September" to the Palestinian guerrillas). The Syrian intervention, without air cover, led to Assad's coup in November, 1970. The pragmatic Assad immediately sought to improve relations with the Hashemite monarchy. The Syrian pro-Jordanian movement received added thrust in the aftermath of Egypt's "Sinai II" accords with Israel. By 1980 the Syrian-Jordanian entente was perhaps the firmest in the region. However, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 signaled a major shift in the relationship.<sup>34</sup> King Hussein has been the most vigorous Arab supporter of Iraq in its struggle with Iran.

Jordanian dependence on Iraqi economic aid coupled with Assad's repression of the Sunni Moslem fundamentalist movement, which has close ties within Jordan, increased tensions between the two governments. Syria boycotted the Jordanian sponsored 1980 Arab summit meeting in Amman, convened ostensibly to resolve the continuing Iran-Iraq conflict. Syria was joined by the other members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (Algeria, PDRY, Libya, and the PLO) in this boycott which further defused the cohesiveness of the Arab world in uniting to resolve regional instabilities.<sup>35</sup>

In partial response to the 1982 Reagan plan for regional peace, King Hussein and PLO chieftain Yasir Arafat signed an accord in February, 1985, outlining the resolution of the complex

Palestinian problem. This accord effectively thrust Hussein back into a responsible role in regional diplomacy. Previously the 1974 Rabat summit conference of Arab leaders had declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat made three concessions which have made it difficult for him to obtain unified support for within the PLO. First, he accepted the concept of exchanging land for peace within the context of previous U.N. resolutions. This equated to tacit acceptance of Israel's right to exist, heretofore the antithesis of fundamental Palestinian ideology. Second, he endorsed the concept of a confederation with Jordan. Finally, Arafat dropped all reference to an independent Palestinian state. Having maneuvered Arafat toward moderation, Hussein has now attempted to bring Israel to the conference table. Both the Israeli and American positions of not officially recognizing the PLO have harmed Hussein's diplomatic efforts. Assad, leery of another "Camp David" from Jordan, has been adamant in his opposition to the Jordanian - PLO accord. Syria charged that in seeking peace with Israel, Hussein and Arafat are defying the collective Arab will and following the "heretical" steps of the late Anwar Sadat of Egypt. However, a Saudi Arabian sponsored reconciliation between Assad and Hussein appears forthcoming in 1986. [The Saudis also want a voice in any future settlements. Conscious of their great wealth and physical vulnerability, Saudi Arabia has traditionally preferred to exercise its persuasion in the form of withholding funds from fellow Arab states - not unlike the U.S.]

attitude toward Israel.] Since Assad controlled the anti-Arafat factions of the PLO, Hussein viewed rapprochement with Syria as a means to pressure Arafat into obtaining acceptance within the PLO for the February 1985, accords. Likewise, Hussein wants to minimize Assad's opposition to Jordan's proposed negotiations with Israel. However, Assad presently remains officially opposed to such negotiations and the diplomatic community expects him to attempt to widen the gap between Hussein and Arafat, who remains Assad's bitter enemy. Assad perceives that the diplomatic road to peace cannot be the Jordanian formula or the Reagan plan, but must involve a Geneva strategy where his prime supporters, the Soviet Union, could play an active part.

#### THE PLO

There is no question that battered Palestinians, in the Diaspora and especially on the West Bank, are dependent upon Arab power for survival. While all Arab states supported the fundamental Palestinian movement, each country subordinated Palestinian goals to their own national interests. Syria and Egypt traditionally have exercised the greatest influence upon the Palestinians. During the 1950's Nasser's pan-Arabism was a natural rallying point for the Palestinian cause. However, by the 1960's Fatah (created in 1957) was increasingly influenced by Syria which singularly supported Fatah's first military operation in 1965 against Israel. Saiqa, Syria's own Palestinian group, was created in 1968. Saiqa has emerged as the second most powerful

faction within the PLO. While Saiga often cooperated with Fatah as fellow members of the PLO, Syria utilized Saiga to influence and monitor Yasir Arafat's leadership.

33

After the PLO were evicted from Jordan in 1970-1971 and migrated to Lebanon the Syrian influence increased substantially. Moreover, as Egypt's rapprochement with Israel became apparent, Syria's image as the only "confrontation state" was further enhanced. However, the PLO has always been suspicious of ulterior Syrian motives. The PLO has not forgotten Syria's intervention against the Palestinians in the 1976 Lebanese civil war. Arafat and Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, have both been imprisoned in Damascus. Assad has often stated his contempt for Arafat. When the PLO accepted evacuation from Lebanon, Arafat, fearing total Syrian domination, strenuously resisted establishing his new headquarters in Damascus and chose the more distant, but politically innocuous Tunis. Although every Arab country has had conflicts with Arafat, none supported Assad's resolve to solely control the PLO. Only Syria and Libya seriously oppose Arafat. The Palestinians on the West Bank clearly oppose Syrian control and have remained loyal to Arafat. While the Syrians are not in a position to oust Arafat, they have continued to influence his options. Syria possessed the wherewithal to accomplish this via its control of arms shipment to the PLO, its own Saiga organization, and its propensity to fuel internal disorder within the PLO. Syria has

been known to support Black June, led by Fatah renegade Abu Nidal. It was Nidal who allegedly was responsible for the December, 1985 terrorist attack in the Rome and Vienna airports. That incident was not the first episode of Nidal's international terrorist activity which caused the PLO embarrassment and loss of international prestige. Arafat has had a price on Abu Nidal's head for the past decade.

38

The classic example of exactly how much control Syria had over the PLO was evident in the boycott of the 1980 Arab summit meeting in Amman. Syria pressured Arafat into joining in that boycott despite the strategic losses the PLO would suffer for not attending. Syria's reason for the boycott was Jordan's growing support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war which again only complicated the PLO's position since Arafat also cultivated Iraqi support. Thus, Syrian exploitation, division within its own ranks, and physical separation from its constituents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, have significantly encumbered the PLO's efforts to provide a unified front for the Palestinian movement.

39

## CHAPTER FOUR - USSR - SYRIA: THE LINK

### EARLY TIES

Russian-Syrian ties date back to modest Soviet arms shipments in 1955. Stalin's death and Khrushchev's policy of attempting to gain leverage in the newly emerging independent states culminated in a Soviet-Syrian economic aid agreement in 1957. In differing with Stalin, Khrushchev cultivated state-to-state relationships as the principal means of exporting world communism. The Communist party in Syria is among the oldest in the Arab world. It has never been a "revolutionary" party, but since Khrushchev's time it has sought legitimacy and rightful purpose in Syrian politics. Since the mid-1950's the Soviets have expended several billion dollars in resupplying the Syrian military establishment and have become virtually the sole source of arms for that country (see Tables 5, 6, and 7). Additionally, Soviet economic aid has reached approximately two billion dollars. While the Euphrates dam, begun in 1968, was the biggest economic project, other non-military assistance included transportation, irrigation, power, and petroleum. Soviet-Syrian diplomatic links were formally united on October 8, 1980 when the two countries signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. This treaty institutionalized the Soviet-Syrian relationship and will be analyzed in detail later in this paper. The events leading up to this treaty and Syria's current position as the principal Soviet client in the region are consistent with two of Moscow's

three fundamental strategies in the Middle East: (1) minimization of Western influence and (2) promotion of Soviet influence. The Soviet's foreign policy vis-a-vis Syria (as elsewhere) has remained essentially pragmatic and unencumbered by any virtuous ideological commitments.<sup>1</sup>

In the early 1970's Anwar Sadat of Egypt sought increased aid from Russia to support the ongoing War of Attrition and preparations for his long planned invasion of Israel. Brezhnev was reluctant to increase military aid to Egypt for fear of impinging upon emerging detente with the United States. From the Kremlin's global perspective, completing the SALT agreement and defusing the U.S. reaction to a major North Vietnamese offensive overshadowed the opportunity cost of increased aid to the Arabs. Sadat's frustration with Moscow was not confined to the lack of military aid. Friction between Soviet military advisors and Egyptian military officials coupled with the Soviet bases in Egypt being declared off-limits to the Egyptians exacerbated the deteriorating relationship between the countries. Finally, on July 18, 1972, the eve of the twentieth anniversary celebration of the Egyptian Revolution, Sadat announced the "termination of the mission of the Soviet military advisors and experts and the placing of all military bases in Egypt under Egyptian control". Shortly thereafter approximately 15,000 Russians departed Egyptian territory. These events marked the post-World War II low point of Soviet influence in the Middle East. Simultaneously Russia's two main global rivals, the U.S. and China, strengthened

their regional influence. North Yemen and the Sudan resumed diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria and Iraq also improved their diplomatic ties to the U.S. during the same timerrame. The Chinese Communist seized the opportunity to capitalize on Soviet misfortunes by expanding their economic support to Egypt. In this context of overall decay in Soviet Middle East influence, the Russians were anxious to look elsewhere for regional support. The Kremlin soon found Syria a willing recipient of Russian military and economic aid. This marked the beginning of Syria's rising importance in the Soviet's Middle East strategy.<sup>2</sup>

#### SYRIAN VULNERABILITY

Hafiz al-Assad had previously cultivated Soviet support while carefully keeping the Russians at arm's length diplomatically. Syria had repeatedly resisted Soviet requests to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Assad perceived that such a treaty would damage the Syrian inter-Arab image, hurt Syrian aid from the Arab oil countries, and incite the religiously sectarian population inside Syria. Previously Assad had publicly criticized similar Soviet treaties with Egypt and Iraq.<sup>3</sup> However, to all the Arab world the Jew remained the most threatening enemy. Moscow attempted to win moral support from the Arabs by imposing a prohibitive exit tax on educated Russian Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel. Also, the Palestinian terrorist attack which killed eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games drastically increased the Syrian's fear of Israeli



military reprisal. The Russians immediately increased their military support of Syria to counter the sharp upsurge in Israeli aggression which followed the Munich massacre. Thus, the Soviets leverage in the Middle East began rising only months after reaching its lowest ebb. It appeared that a small amount of fighting in the region, short of superpower confrontation, was a boost to Soviet strategy in that it increased the Arab's, during this timeframe specifically Syria's, dependence upon Russia for military support.<sup>4</sup>

Sadat's moderate rapprochement with Brezhnev led to the resumption of Soviet arms supply to Egypt. The Yom Kippur War soon followed. While the American diplomat, Henry Kissinger, successfully engineered an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement (Sinai I and Sinai II) at the conclusion of that conflict, he was unsuccessful in achieving the same results between Syria and Israel in the Golan Heights region. The Russians urged the Arab oil producing states to continue their Western oil embargo as long as the fighting continued along the Golan. Kissinger, with Sadat's help, ended the oil embargo despite Russian and Syrian initiatives to the contrary. While the termination of the oil embargo was considered a significant defeat of Soviet regional diplomacy,<sup>5</sup> it drove the Syrians deeper into the Soviet camp.

During the 1973 war Soviet aid to Syria increased dramatically. Between 10 and 23 October, 3750 tons of Soviet military equipment was airlifted to Syria and a greater amount arrived by

sea. Following the war the Soviets replaced lost Syrian aircraft with a large number of MIG-21s, introduced the advanced MIG-23 ground attack aircraft, fortified the country's air defense posture, and supplied SCUD surface-to-surface missiles capable of strategic penetration of Israeli territory. Tables 5, 6, and 7 reflect the fact that, in the decade following the Yom Kippur War, Syria was the largest importer of Soviet arms in the Middle East.<sup>6</sup>

Soviet policymakers soon realized that increased Syrian dependence on the USSR for weapons imports did not necessarily translate into additional Soviet political influence in Syria. Neither did increased Soviet aid resolve differing concepts between the two nations concerning ultimate regional peace. When Syrian Foreign Ministers Abdel Khaddam visited Moscow in 1975, Gromyko, his Soviet counterpart, bluntly stated that no peace was possible without the guarantee of Israel's right to existence which the Russians accepted, but the Syrians did not.<sup>7</sup> Since 1967 UN Resolution 242 remained the basis for peace negotiations in the Middle East. The basic proposition of UN Resolution 242 was that to recover territories occupied by Israel, the Arab states would have to commit themselves to recognize Israel's right to existence. UN Resolution 338, which ostensibly resolved the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and is often cited in peace negotiations, was merely a reaffirmation of Resolution 242. The Russians support both UN resolutions while the level of Syrian support has remained questionable. This fundamental philosophical

difference continued to thwart peace initiatives in the  
8  
succeeding years.

Concerning the Palestinian problem, both sides did agree on the creation of an independent Palestinian state. It was through the Palestinian movement that the Soviets sought to form a coalition, headed by Syria, to counter the emerging Egyptian-Israel rapprochement. The events of the mid-to-late 1970's culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Sinai II, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the Camp David accords) have all been discussed earlier in this paper. Suffice it to say that, inter alia, those events isolated Syria from the Egyptians and, coupled with Syria's continuing clashes with Jordan and Iraq, influenced Assad to finally sign a formal treaty with the Soviets in 1980.

#### SOVIET - SYRIAN FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TREATY - 1980

As a prelude to understanding the full impact of the treaty an appreciation for each sides prior expectations is essential. Two factors were decisive in finally convincing Assad to sign a Soviet friendship treaty which the Soviets had sought for the preceding decade: (1) domestic subversion at home instigated by the Moslem Brotherhood, and (2) the rapidly expanding Syrian isolation from the Arab mainstream. On the homefront, a Soviet pact would at least ensure passive acceptance of Assad's continued rule and at most provide the avenue for active Soviet intervention to bolster the Alawi government should Assad deem it necessary. Externally, a Soviet pact would deter Israel from

possible future aggression directed at the Syrian homeland. Assad was concerned with Syria's regional isolation. Egypt continued her rapprochement with Israel, Saudi Arabia was closely linked with the U.S., Jordan was aiding the Moslem Brotherhood, Iran faced its own domestic problems, and Libya was busy processing military initiatives in Africa. Therefore, Assad perceived the opportunity cost of a Soviet pact, i.e., a degree of political and military subordination to the Soviets, was well worth the effort.<sup>9</sup>

Brezhnev had previously orchestrated six similar treaties with Third World countries during the 1970's. Obviously Moscow perceived such treaties were diplomatically prestigious and often provided the Soviets the flexibility and access needed to react to changing world scenarios. Brezhnev had cited the Kremlin's treaty with Afghanistan as justification for the Soviet invasion of that country. In Syria the Soviets understood that Assad had significant domestic trouble, but the alternative to the Alawite regime was the Islamic extremist Moslem Brotherhood, noted for its anti-Soviet posture. Moscow's own regional prestige was waning due to its invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets were also envious of the Carter administration's gains in Egypt, Oman, and Somalia. Thus, the Soviets viewed a Syrian friendship treaty as a decidedly positive move. The only major negative inflection was the possibility of future independent Syrian aggression against Israel which might confront Moscow with the classic

dilemma of whether to support an ally or face a possible super-<sup>10</sup>power confrontation.

The actual treaty did not change previously established policies between the two governments, but merely institutionalized existing relations. It was specifically not a "defense treaty" which the Syrians were advocating during the developmental stage. The Kremlin could interpret the defensive perspective of the agreement when such interpretation was consistent with Soviet goals. Moscow was carefully balancing its diplomatic relations with Iraq, a previous treaty signatory, and Syria, both clients at odds with each other. Also a formal Syrian defensive treaty might force Israel to seek the same from the United States which was exactly what the Soviets did not want. The text of the agreement did not differ significantly from previous Soviet friendship and cooperation treaties with Third World countries. There were no explicit statements clarifying the extent of the Soviet military obligation to Syria. The treaty called for "cooperation in the military field" and "mutual<sup>11</sup> consultations on threats to each other's security".

The possibility of secret appendices existed. Article 10 stated: "The high contracting parties shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them in the interest of strengthening their defense capacity". The accepted explanation of "appropriate agreements" was that secret appendices existed which more explicitly stated the level of Soviet military support

12

earmarked for Syria.

Since signing the treaty in 1980 there has been one major test of the active military support nature of the agreement - Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Only two manifestations of Soviet strategic support for Syria were evident: (1) the movement of additional Russian naval warships through the Bosphorous Straits to the Eastern Mediterranean, and (2) the increased alert posture of twenty-six Soviet divisions along Russian's southern border. Both these actions occurred after Israel had attained significant gains in Lebanon. Therefore, the moves were interpreted by the West as not intended to deter Israel in Lebanon (else they would have occurred earlier in the war), but signaled that further escalation into Syrian territory could invite active Soviet intervention.

#### MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation treaty hedged the question of explicitly when direct Soviet military intervention could be expected in the Middle East. Most experts believed the Soviets would only intervene directly if the very survival of Syria were at stake. In conflicts of lesser magnitude, i.e., Lebanese civil war or surgical Israeli air strikes against Syria, the Russians could only be expected to provide sophisticated military equipment and an ample supply of advisors.

Prior to 1980 the Soviets had approximately 2,500 military advisors in Syria. In Egypt, prior to the War of Attrition,

there were similarly about 3,000 advisors. Unlike the Egyptian scenario where the Soviets increased their commitment to 20,000 men after assuming responsibility for Egypt's anti-aircraft defense, the Soviets actually decreased their total Syrian advisors to about 2,000 men within two years after signing the<sup>15</sup> friendship and cooperation treaty. However, when the Syrians lost 90 aircraft and all their air defense systems in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to Israeli forces in June, 1982, the Soviets embarked on the largest reequipment effort in their history. The Russians provided the Syrians with an air defense system of unprecedented sophistication. In addition to replacing lost equipment, the USSR supplied Syria with long range SA-5 surface-to-air missiles and mobile SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles. The SA-5's are based at Dumayr and Homs which extends their range over all of Lebanon and well into the Mediterranean Sea to combat large high flying aircraft. Aside from Syria, the SA-5 and SS-21 are not found outside the Warsaw Pact; in fact, Syria received SA-5's prior to their deployment to East European countries. An estimated 5,000 Soviet military personnel were sent to Syria to operate and train Assad's forces on this new equipment. By mid-1985 about 3,000 Soviets had been withdrawn. The current Soviet military presence in Syria is estimated once again to number 2,000 personnel. Tables 8 and 9 reflect the historical degree of military personnel interchange between the Soviets and Syrians and portrays the priority the Soviets assign their Syrian client

with respect to other Middle East states.

During U.S. naval air operations in late 1983 and early 1984 the author of this paper flew F-14 combat reconnaissance missions over Lebanon which encountered a moderate degree of anti-aircraft (AAA) and surface-to-air (SAM) missile fire. It is interesting to note that all the missiles observed were the SA-7 variant which is a relatively unsophisticated heat-seeking missile. Therefore, the author concludes that, while the Soviets provided the Syrians a credible air defense capability in Lebanon, its operational use was restricted to protection of direct Syrian assets and it was specifically not authorized for use against non-threatening American reconnaissance missions. This hypothesis appears consistent with Soviet policy of desiring regional influence, but not desiring a superpower confrontation. The Russian's sensitivity to potential escalation of regional crises to direct American confrontation has often been criticized in the Arab world. The loss of U.S. F-14's to Soviet manned air defense systems could have certainly led to just such a confrontation.

Equally significant to the number of Soviet advisors in Syria, is the physical infrastructure within the country to accommodate the Russians. Prior to 1980, the Commander of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Yegorov, had encouraged an increase in Syrian support facilities for his fleet. However, Damascus was reluctant to grant Moscow bases in Syria. Soviet naval presence in the ports of Tartus and Latakia were maintained under the classification of "facilities and services" not



"bases". Since the friendship treaty this situation has not  
17  
changed.

#### THE FUTURE

The Soviets have made it quite clear that they want a voice in any Middle East negotiations. This is the fundamental axiom of their Middle East strategy. As the principal Soviet regional client, the Syrians support this view. The Kremlin favors a return to Geneva. The 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference was the last time the Soviets participated in a co-equal role with the United States in the peace process. However, in 1973 the Geneva Conference accomplished nothing and adjourned sine die  
18  
and has never been reconvened.

By the mid-1980's the Soviets probably had no Third World relationship it valued more than its entente with Syria. Soviet-Syrian interests often run parallel and reinforce each other, but when they diverge, the limits of Soviet influence become evident. Inter-Arab rivalries between Syria/PLO and Syria/Iraq have seriously handicapped Soviet diplomacy. Moscow supports both the PLO, in their quest for a homeland, and Iraq, in its war with Iran. The level of Soviet support for Iraq is reflected in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. However, unquestionably the Soviet's support for Arafat as the head of the PLO is the stickiest problem. Assad's contempt of Arafat has led to hot war between Syria and the PLO on three occasions; 1976, 1983, and 1985. Each time Moscow exerted strong pressure on Damascus to terminate the

hostilities. The Soviets halted arms shipments to Syria in 1976. In 1983 the Russians obtained a ceasefire in Lebanon and ensured Arafat's evacuation from Tripoli. In 1985 the Soviets forced Syria to halt the attacks on the Beirut Palestinian refugee camps being carried out by Syria's Amal militia clients. On the other hand, Moscow has expressed distaste for the Jordanian/PLO February, 1985, accord because of its tendency toward meeting U.S. terms for regional peace and again isolating both Syria and the Soviets. Therefore, despite significant differences in opinion, the Soviet-Syrian relationship has continued to weather the traditional Middle East political turmoil.

## CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION

Syria's relationship with the U.S.S.R. is simply another Middle East complexity that does not easily fit into the clear definitions preferred by American observers. Americans often view the regional superpower rivalry as a zero sum game, i.e., setbacks to the Americans automatically translate to Soviet gains and vice versa. This is just not true. For example, the disintegration of American influence in Iran did not lead to increased Russian leverage. The same analogy is true in Syria. The United States should not concede Syria to the Russians simply because the Soviets have made significant gains in that country over the past fifteen years.

Presently Soviet Middle East policy appears stuck in a rut. Despite literally billions of dollars in economic and military aid the Soviets contemporary Middle East influence has never regained pre-1972 war levels. The Soviets are often torn between facing a superpower confrontation in the Middle East due to a major crisis and losing what influence they have due to a lasting stable peace. The U.S. should capitalize on this fact and provide Syria with viable options other than total and exclusive dependence upon the Soviet Union.

## CHAPTER SIX - AUTHOR'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROPOSAL

A lasting resolution to the contemporary Middle East problems has evaded policymakers since World War II. Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the tension has focused on the Palestinian issue coupled with Israel's refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, the confusion in Lebanon has shown no sign of sorting itself out. Assad's latest attempt at brokering peace has only led to increased sectarianism whereby Christians are now fighting other Christians. The Lebanese issue is intertwined to a degree with the Palestinian problem, therefore both should be addressed together. While a permanent, peaceful solution seems difficult, it is not altogether beyond reasonable expectation. The two regional players, without whom permanent peace will never be achieved, are unquestionably Israel and Syria. However, the leadership of both these countries could face major internal disorder if a peaceful settlement was actually achieved. Assad's power base within Syria is a strong military organization, ostensibly funded to counter potential Israeli aggression. Without his formidable military force, or a reason for its existence, Assad's strongfisted internal regime could be in jeopardy. The same is true in Israel. Any return of even portions of the West Bank to the Arabs could lead to the collapse of Peres' coalition government and quite possibly civil war within Israel. Chauvinistic Israelis, despite their setback in Lebanon, are nostalgic for the

Likud party's previous aggressive foreign policy. It is rumored that the popular militant, Ariel Sharon, has sworn a secret oath that if any future Israeli government attempts to withdraw from the West Bank he will fight to the death to prevent such action.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, before even the germane issues pertaining to lasting Middle East peace may be addressed, it is necessary for the key players, Israel and Syria, first, actually to want peace, and second, to have the internal political cohesion to survive the necessary compromises which lasting peace would undoubtedly entail. The superpowers are the only agents with the capacity to encourage the necessary conditions within the two countries, i.e., the Soviets within Syria and the United States within Israel. To accomplish such superpower intervention the U.S. would have to invite the Soviets back into a decisive role in brokering Middle East peace. This concept is contrary to President Reagan's current perceptions of appropriate American Middle East policy. I believe it is in America's best interest for the Administration to reconsider this issue. The closing paragraphs of this paper will briefly summarize my proposal for Middle East peace and are based upon the supposition that the superpowers will support the survival of the present governments within Israel and Syria. Admittedly this is a vital assumption, but it is doubtful whether anything less revolutionary can break the regional impasse and bring lasting peace to the area.

New dialogues are essential as preliminary steps in addressing the situation. Unanimous recognition of the PLO as the

legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the acknowledgement of Yasir Arafat as the PLO leader are at the very heart of the issue. Former U.S. Ambassador and special Middle East negotiator, Philip Habib, remarked ... "In search for peace in the Middle East, there can be no solution without a solution of the Palestinian question ... the Palestinian question, however you want to define it, is at the core."<sup>2</sup> The U.S., Israel, and Syria must realize the futility of not officially recognizing Arafat and the PLO. In the mid-1980's Arafat certainly represents a "moderate" voice in the Palestinian national movement and Arafat has, on numerous occasions expressed his willingness to negotiate with Israel. Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, Brian Urquhart (chief Middle East crisis manager for four Secretaries-General and known in diplomatic circles as "Mr. Middle East"), stated in 1984 that ... "From the beginning he (Arafat) has been the only Palestinian leader who could talk about dealing with Israel and not be killed the next day for saying so."<sup>3</sup> Assad must reconcile his differences with Arafat and stop Syria's incessant attempts to sabotage Palestinian unity. The United States is also not pure on this issue. We Americans, steeped in nationalistic traditions, should identify with the plight of the Palestinians, for it is not significantly different from the plight of the Jews forty years ago. Americans should not forget that during the Iranian hostage crisis we were grateful for Arafat's efforts to free our countrymen.

The same concept of recognition also applies to Israel. The Soviets must again establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv (they withdrew their ambassador after the 1967 war). The Egyptians must do the same (they withdrew their ambassador after the Israeli's 1982 invasion of Lebanon). Once all pertinent powers have recognized the PLO and Israel (and those two have recognized each other) the Palestinian question can be addressed in a forthright, logical manner. The U.S. should then seize the initiative and convene a new Geneva Middle East Peace Conference with the Americans and Soviets sharing equal roles as co-hosts. The following key proposals should be addressed at Geneva by all the pertinent states:

1. West Bank: Israel should return a portion of the West Bank to Jordan. This is in keeping with the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242, the key being a "portion" and not "all" the occupied territories. Figure 3 is a proposal for just such a division. Jerusalem would be on the border and should be established as an open city with free rights of passage for Jews, Christians, and Moslems.

2. Gaza Strip: Israel should return the Gaza to full Egyptian control. It is the least significant territory which Israel now occupies.

3. Golan Heights: Syria should formally cede the Golan to Israel. Because of its geography, this area is strategically more significant to Israel than it is to Syria.

4. Palestinians: The PLO should establish a federation with Jordan and another federation with Egypt. Autonomous Palestinian rule in the West Bank and Gaza would be coordinated with the respective host government, i.e., Jordan and Egypt. Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Middle East should be disbanded within two years, with the burden on the host government, with substantial financial contributions from the Arab oil producing countries, to resolve the resulting economic dilemma.

5. Lebanon: Syria should annex the Bekaa Valley (militarily Syria controls the Bekaa now). The Israelis should annex the southern portion of Lebanon south of the Litani River. The remainder of Lebanon should be divided into two parts divided by the Beirut-Damascus highway, a Moslem ruled state in the South and a Christian ruled state in the North. This division is based upon existing Christian and Moslem population settlements. Beirut should remain an independent city with free passage for all parties (refer to Figure 4).

6. United Nations: A substantially sized U.N. peace-keeping force, comprised of contingents from all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, should be deployed to Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza for a minimum of five years.

7. Pledge of Security: All parties should pledge to recognize the newly established boundaries, the rights of all states to existence, and the termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict.



There would undoubtedly be countless parochial reasons why the aforementioned proposals would not be acceptable. However, when closely examined the proposals require each side to compromise on some issues and achieve minor victories on others. The dismantling of Lebanon is admittedly a bold step. Yet what is Lebanon today? Is it a real country? If so, who is in charge? The Palestinians would be presented with a chance to shed the refugee camps and establish some type of national identity. The Jews should be satisfied that the Arab world now formally recognized their existence and the Israeli borders are secure. The Soviets should be satisfied since they would be major participants in negotiating the settlement. The U.S. could take pride in the fact that there is the distinct possibility of lasting peace. In closing, a fitting epitaph to the complexities of the Middle East follows:

"O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!"

Jesus contemplating Jerusalem  
From the Mount of Olives

Matthew 23:37

Table 1

Religious Composition of Syria's Population, 1985

Orthodox Moslems	7,150,000	
Native Sunni Arabs		5,700,000
Kurds		900,000
Palestine Arabs		300,000
Turkomans		150,000
Circassians		100,000
Heterodox Moslems	2,000,000	
Alawis		1,350,000
Druzes		300,000
Ismailis		200,000
Shiites		150,000
Christians	800,000	
Others	50,000	

---

Estimated total resident population = 10-10.5 million people

Table 2

ARAB

Population Figures

(in millions)

Middle East Arabs  
(including Palestinians)

Egypt*	48.0
Iraq	15.0
Syria	10.5
Saudi Arabia	9.0
Yemen	7.5
Lebanon	3.5
Jordan	2.5
PDRY	2.0
Kuwait	1.7
Oman	1.5
United Arab Emirates	1.3
Bahrain	.4
Qatar	<u>.3</u>

Total 103.0+

Palestinians

Israel*	.6
West Bank	.8
Gaza Strip	.5
Jordan	1.3
Lebanon	.5
Elsewhere	<u>1.0</u>
Total	4.7+

\*within pre-1967 war border

Other Arab Population

Libya	3.5
Sudan	10.0
Tunisia	7.0
Morocco	24.0
Algeria	22.0
Other	<u>5.0</u>
Total	71.0+

\*Egypt represents approximately 47% of total Arab population in Middle East.

TOTAL WORLD ARAB POPULATION EXCEEDS 174 MILLION

Table 3

ISRAELI/JEWISH

Population Figures  
(in millions)

<u>Israel-within pre-1967</u> <u>war borders</u>		<u>World Jewish Population</u>	
Jews	3.4	U.S.	5.8
Arabs	____.6	Israel	3.4
Total	4.0	U.S.S.R.	1.7
<u>Arabs Within occupied territories</u>		France	.5
West Bank	.8	Great Britain	.4
Gaza Strip	.5	Canada	.3
<u>Total Israel Population Today</u>		Argentina	.2
Jews	3.4	South Africa	.1
Arabs	1.9	Brazil	.1
		Elsewhere	____.5
		Total	13.0+

\*NOTE: Arab population growth within Israel is significantly higher than Jewish population growth. By approximately 2015 the Arab and Jewish populations could be equal, by 2025 the Arabs could be in the majority.

Table 4

Rank Order of the Ten Largest Less Developed Arms  
Importing Countries, 1973-1982

1. Iraq
2. Libya
3. Iran
4. Syria
5. Saudi Arabia
6. Israel
7. Egypt
8. India
9. Algeria
10. Vietnam

Table 5

Rank Order of Middle Eastern States Dependent on USSR for  
Imports of Arms, 1963-1982

(in million constant 1972 US dollars)

<u>Recipient</u>	<u>USSR</u> <u>Arms Imports</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Arms Imports</u>	<u>Percent Arms</u> <u>from USSR</u>
1. South Yemen	702	728	96.4
2. Afghanistan	952	998	95.4
3. Egypt	3,598	4,013	89.7
4. Syria	7,882	9,344	84.4
5. Algeria	2,670	3,239	82.4
6. Iraq	6,856	11,714	58.5
7. Libya	5,463	9,389	58.2
8. Yemen	598	1,329	45.0
9. Iran	1,006	11,344	8.9
10. Kuwait	44	765	5.8
11. Lebanon	10	230	4.3
12. Jordan	75	1,984	3.8
13. Morocco	13	1,668	0.8
Middle East Totals	29,889	75,243	39.7

Table 6

Soviet Military Assistance  
to Middle East Countries

1966-1980

(in millions of 1985 constant dollars)

Syria	7,158
Iraq	6,343
Libya	5,925
Egypt	2,485
Algeria	2,048

Table 7

Value of Soviet Arms Transfers  
to Middle East Countries

1979-1983

(in millions of 1985 constant dollars)

Syria	9,200
Iraq	7,200
Yemen	1,500
PDRY	1,200
Iran	975
Jordan	230
Egypt	40
Kuwait	30



Table 8

Soviet Military Advisors  
in Middle East Countries  
1984

Syria	5,300
Iraq	1,300
PDRY	1,100
Yemen	510
Iran	50
Others	50
<hr/>	
Total	8,310

Table 9

Military Personnel From Middle East

Countries Trained in USSR

1955-1984

Syria	6,600
Egypt	5,665
Libya	4,490
Yemen	4,310
Iraq	4,110
PDRY	1,395
Iran	315


Table 10

Syrian Military Expenditures  
versus Gross National Product  
1973-1983

(in millions of 1982 constant dollars)

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES	GNP	%
1973	927	6,334	14.6
1974	988	8,019	12.3
1975	1,544	9,854	15.7
1976	1,537	10,612	14.5
1977	1,472	10,398	14.2
1978	1,626	11,333	14.4
1979	1,855	11,845	15.7
1980	2,163	13,118	16.5
1981	2,203	14,149	15.6
1982	2,371	14,934	15.8
1983	2,051	15,774	13.0

Figure 1



SOURCE: The Blood of Abraham by Jimmy Carter, Houghton Mifflin Co / Boston 1985

Figure 2




Figure 3





Figure 4



## NOTES

### CHAPTER TWO

1. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1985), pp. 3-6.
2. Ibid, pp. 74-75.
3. Ibid, pp. 83-93.
4. Jonathan Steele, Soviet Power, The Kremlin's Foreign Policy-Brezhnev to Chernenko (New York, Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), pp. 3-25.
5. Ibid, p. 49.
6. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York, Praeger, 1982), pp. 3-7.
7. Steele, pp. 182-183.
8. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, ed. The Soviet Union in the Middle East (New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982), pp. 31-32.
9. Steele, pp. 182-186.
10. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, CBS College Publishing, 1983), pp. 30-31.
11. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 135-137.
12. Rubinstein, pp. 199-207.
13. Donald R. Kelley, ed., Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (New York, Praeger, 1980), p. 248.
14. John Burch, "Israeli Military Doctrine/Strategy," Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1985, p. 7.
15. Steele, p. 190.
16. Ibid, p. 193.
17. Rubinstein, p. 202.
18. Institute for the Study of Conflict, Soviet Objectives in the Middle East (London, 1974), p. 8.



19. Steele, p. 197.
20. Ibid, pp. 196-198.
21. Rubinstein, pp. 203-204.
22. Freedman, pp. 275-333.
23. Ibid, pp. 345-362.
24. Ibid, pp. 377-425.
25. Augustus R. Norton, Moscow and the Palestinians (Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), pp. 1-26.
26. Steele, p. 200.
27. Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, Colorado, Western Press, 1984), pp. 193-225.
28. Ibid, p. 44.
29. Ibid.
30. Herbert L. Sawyer, "Soviet Perceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iran January-June, 1983," Unpublished Report, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1985, p. 3.
31. Ibid, p. 4.
32. Steele, pp. 116-130.
33. Ibid.

### CHAPTER THREE

1. John F. Devlin, Syria, A Modern State in an Ancient Land (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983), pp. 37-44.
2. Howard LaFay, "Syria," National Geographic, September 1978, p. 327.
3. Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Syria, A Country Study (Washington, DC, American University Press, 1979), pp. 27-32.
4. Nikola Schahgaldian, "Sectarian Politics and the Islamic Challenge in Syria," Middle East Insight, June/July 1985, pp. 22-23.

5. Ibid. D, pp. 23-24.
6. R.D. McLaurin, Middle East Foreign Policy (New York, Praeger, 1982), pp. 242-243.
7. Schahgaldian, pp. 23-24.
8. Devlin, pp. 45-56.
9. Moshe Maoz, Syria Under Hafiz al Asad: New Domestic and Foreign Policies (Jerusalem, Jerusalem Post Press, 1975), pp. 5-12.
10. Ibid.
11. Schahgaldian, pp. 26-27.
12. LaFay, pp. 331-335.
13. Schahgaldian, p. 27.
14. Devlin, pp. 57-60.
15. Ibid., pp. 60-62.
16. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
17. Schahgaldian, p. 27-28.
18. Devlin, pp. 73-74.
19. Schahgaldian, p. 29.
20. Alasdair Drysdale, "The Succession Question in Syria," The Middle East Journal, Spring 1985, pp. 246-251.
21. Ibid., pp. 252-257.
22. Devlin, pp. 99-101.
23. Ibid., pp. 101-104.
24. McLaurin, pp. 270-272.
25. Devlin, p. 105.
26. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
27. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York, Praeger, 1982), pp. 275-278.

28. Devlin, p. 107.
29. Nancy Cooper, "The Mideast Power Broker," Newsweek, January 6, 1986, p. 30.
30. Ibid.
31. McLaurin, pp. 267-268.
32. Robert G. Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Winter 83/84, pp. 237-256.
33. Devlin, pp. 108-110.
34. McLaurin, pp. 269-270.
35. Devlin, pp. 110-111.
36. "The Illusion of Progress." Middle East Policy Survey. 22 February 1985, pp. 1-3.
37. Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1984), pp. 193-225.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

1. John F. Devlin, Syria, A Modern State in an Ancient Land (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983), pp. 112-114.
2. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York, Praeger, 1982), pp. 85-102.
3. Amiram Nir, The Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: Unfulfilled Expectations (Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 5.
4. Freedman, pp. 103-117.
5. Ibid., pp. 128-161.
6. Alexander J. Bennett, "Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Policy in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, 756-758.
7. Freedman, p. 204.

8. Alfred L. Atherton, "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 691-195.

9. Nir, pp. 5-6.

10. Ibid., pp. 7-10.

11. Robert G. Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Winter 83/84, pp. 237-256.

12. Nir, pp. 12-13.

13. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

14. Ibid., p. 24.

15. Neumann, pp. 241-243.

16. Bennett, pp. 757-758.

17. Nir, pp. 25-26.

18. Atherton, pp. 699-704.

19. Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Views of the Soviet Role in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 729-731.

#### CHAPTER SIX

1. Alan Hart, Arafat Terrorist or Peacemaker? (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), p. 391.

2. Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985), p. 204.

3. Hart, p. 450.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atherton, Alfred L. "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View." The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 688-715.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983.
- Bennett, Alexander J. "Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Policy in the Middle East." The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 745-774.
- Burch, John. "Israeli Military Doctrine/Strategy." Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1985.
- Carter, Jimmy. The Blood of Abraham. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985.
- Cohen, Stephen F., ed. The Soviet Union Since Stalin. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980.
- Confino, Michael and Shamir, Shimon, eds. The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. New York: Israel Universities Press, 1973.
- Cooper, Nancy. "The Mideast Power Broker." Newsweek, January 6, 1986, p. 30.
- Dawisha, Adeed and Karen, eds., The Soviet Union in the Middle East. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982.
- Devlin, John F. Syria, A Modern State in an Ancient Land. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983.
- Devlin, John F. The Baath Party. Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976.
- Donaldson, Robert H., ed. The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.
- Drysdale, Alasdair. "The Succession Question in Syria." The Middle East Journal, Spring 1985, pp. 246-257.
- Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

- Edmond, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy, The Brezhnev Years. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Freedman, Robert O. Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Freedman, Robert O., ed. The Middle East Since Camp David. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.
- Hart, Alan. Arafat Terrorist or Peacemaker? London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.
- Institute for the Study of Conflict. Soviet Objectives in the Middle East. London: 1974.
- Kanet, Roger E., ed. Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Kauppi, Mark V. and Nation, Craig., eds. The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983.
- Kelley, Donald R., ed. Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era. New York: Praeger, 1980.
- Khalidi, Rashid. "Arab View of the Soviet Role in the Middle East." The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 716-732.
- Kohler, Foy D. The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War. Center for Advanced International Studies: University of Miami, 1974.
- LaFay, Howard. "Syria". National Geographic, September 1978, pp. 326-361.
- Laqueur, Walter and Rubin, Barry, eds. The Israel-Arab Reader. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985.
- Maoz, Moshe. Syria Under Hafiz al-Asad: New Domestic and Foreign Policies. Jerusalem Post Press, 1975.
- McLaurin, R.D. Middle East Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- McLaurin, R.D. The Middle East in Soviet Policy. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1975.
- Napper, Larry C. "The Arab Autumn of 1984: A Case Study of Soviet Middle East Policy." The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1985, pp. 733-744.

- Neumann, Robert G. "Assad and the Future of the Middle East." Foreign Affairs, Winter 83/84, pp. 237-257.
- Nir, Amiram. The Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: Unfulfilled Expectations. Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, 1983.
- Norton, Augustus R., Moscow and the Palestinians. Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974.
- Nyrop, Richard F. ed. Syria, A Country Study. Washington, DC: American University Press, 1979.
- Peretz, Don. The Middle East Today. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1985.
- Sawyer, Herbert L. "Soviet Perceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iran January-June, 1983," Unpublished Report, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1985.
- Schahgaldian, Nikola. "Sectarian Politics and the Islamic Challenge in Syria." Middle East Insight, June/July 1985, pp. 20-29.
- Sella, Amnon. Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Shevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking With Moscow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.
- Smith, Hedrick. The Russians. New York: Times Books, 1983.
- Spanier, John. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: CBS College Publishing, 1983.
- Steele, Jonathan. Soviet Power, The Kremlin's Foreign Policy - Brezhnev to Chernenko. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984.
- The Illusion of Progress." Middle East Policy Survey, 22 February 1985, pp. 1-3.
- Ulam, Adam B. Dangerous Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Voth, Alden H. Moscow Abandons Israel for the Arabs. Boston: University Press of America, 1980.